All relevant data are within the paper and Supporting Information files

1. Introduction {#sec001}
===============

Securitization is a financial technique that allows the issuer to modify a set of non-liquid rights which are subsequently traded in the market. These are therefore backed by a series of predetermined payment flows. Securitization also acts as a mechanism for transferring risk. The transactions are typically divided into different tranches with differing risk-return characteristics and a hierarchical structure; low, medium and high risk corresponding to senior, mezzanine and equity tranches respectively.

According to the European Securitization Forum, the volume of securitized assets in Europe grew from 85,998.78 million US dollars in 2000, to 1,209,250.57 million US dollars in 2008. However, during the 2007/2008 financial crisis, while European securitized assets suffered only small losses, the market itself seemed to have been tarnished by association. This provoked a sharp decline in the volume of securitizations after the first quarter of 2008. In 2013, a total of 239,599 million dollars' worth of securitized products were issued in Europe, 80% less than in 2008. In 2014, the number of transactions slowly began to increase, reaching a volume of 288,342.63 million US dollars, before falling to 267,627.81 million US dollars in 2017. In short, the European securitization markets have remained subdued. In practice, the amount actually available to investors is even smaller, since many banks, particularly in southern Europe, are securitizing existing assets to create collateral that allows them to obtain cheap funding from the ECB. This type of securitization is most common in the UK, and then France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. Together these countries made up 66% of total European securitized products in 2017.

European authorities responded to the prolonged financial crisis by introducing extensive regulatory reforms. These included new rules for risk retention as well as stricter liquidity and updated capital and transparency requirements for banks intending to carry out future securitizations. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision \[[@pone.0228141.ref001]\] identified a number of shortcomings in the Basel II securitization framework. Specifically, the committee underlined problems with respect to the calibration of risk weights and a lack of incentives for diligent risk management. Their analysis resulted in the specific objectives laid out in Basel III. Recently, the committee has been keen to promote the idea of simplifying securitization and making it more transparent and comparable (STC). The focus is on the long-term goal of building a sustainable securitization market rather than reviving securitization in the short term. The implementation of these regulatory initiatives has been rather fragmented and sluggish. This has given rise to uncertainty and made securitization products uneconomical for some investors \[[@pone.0228141.ref002]\]. The European financial system however, has received extraordinary support from the European Central Bank, which bought securitization bonds as part of its quantitative easing (QE) program.

Against this background, we analyze the impact of securitization on financial stability and the systematic and systemic risk of European securitization issuance between 2000 and 2017. We find that securitization has a positive impact on the issuing entities' systematic risk and that the effect is present between the years 2000 and June 2007. Subsequently, no effect was recorded. The increase in systematic risk arises through an increase in systemic risk and in the specific risk for each entity. These results, for the European securitization market, were also recorded for securitization in the core and peripheral countries, and in the UK and Spain when analysed as individual countries. In the case of core countries and the UK, the increase in systematic risk was due exclusively to an increase in the specific risk of the originating entity.

There are several good reasons that justify the importance of studying the effects of securitization. First, from the point of view of the regulators, enacting relevant and soundly based regulations should help to restore market confidence in securitization. Second, this kind of study enables investors and future shareholders to better evaluate their positioning and to reduce asymmetries of information. In addition, from the point of view of the originating entities, the knowledge of how their securitizations affect their risk-taking strategy is also highly important. Finally, because of the way in which financial activity takes place, there must be a structured efficient market that offers the right levels of liquidity.

Our study enlarges upon previous empirical work in two ways. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study to carry out an empirical investigation into the risks arising from securitization and how these affect markets as a whole and, in particular, how they affect the originator. We carry out this analysis against the backdrop of a boom-period in securitization in Europe followed by a financial crisis and finally, a period of recovery. As \[[@pone.0228141.ref003]\] highlight, the data and analyses that look at European securitization is too sparse and underdeveloped to be able to draw substantive conclusions, particularly with respect to the post-crisis period.

Second, the paper enlarges upon the existing literature by using event study methodology and carrying out estimations with both symmetrical and asymmetrical event windows set around the securitization registry date. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time asymmetrical windows have been applied to study effective risk retention. They allow us to adapt the period in which the event in question has an effect. This is a fundamental aspect of our study in which the main date, the date of the event, is that of registration; prior to this are other key dates that concern the constitution of the vehicle of securitization and the announcement of the forthcoming issue. The issue itself is made effective at later date.

This analysis makes significant advances with respect to our previous research in which we looked at the effects of securitization in Spanish financial institutions and between 1993 and 2010. The present work looks at a range of countries (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Spain, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK) and analyzes the effects of securitization over a broader time period (2000--2017). This allows us to compare the effects of pre and post-crisis securitization, which is of particular importance given the dearth of studies looking into post-crisis European securitization. In addition, although the methodology used in this work is based on former studies, it has been significantly improved because it makes the estimates more flexible; as far as we know, symmetrical and asymmetrical event windows have never been used before.

Following this introduction, this paper contains five sections. Section 2 reviews the pertinent literature and the relevant empirical studies. Section 3 describes the database. The empirical methodology is set out in section 4 and the results are described in section 5. The paper concludes with a summary of the main conclusions and policy implications.

2. Securitization and financial stability {#sec002}
=========================================

Importantly, securitization affects the risk profile and the financial soundness of the issuing entities and the financial system as a whole.

Economic theory provides opposing expected effects with respect to the securitization of credit risk and banking stability. This is because the expected effect has two parts, one which is direct and the other indirect. The direct impact of securitization on the risk borne by the originating entity depends on how much risk is actually transferred to external investors \[[@pone.0228141.ref004]\]. In this sense, the behavior of originator entities has changed over time and is determined by the type of securitization. The indirect impact of securitization on the originating entity depends on the strategy followed by the originator when reinvesting the resultant liquidity. This impact depends on the investment policy adopted and is defined by the risk transformation within the bank's portfolio \[[@pone.0228141.ref005], [@pone.0228141.ref006], [@pone.0228141.ref007]\].

It is also difficult to study the effects of securitization on individual risk and upon the market as a whole because of the changes that securitization provokes in the behavior of the originators. Some of the empirical literature has raised the question whether securitization makes the further acquisition of risk more attractive for banks \[[@pone.0228141.ref008], [@pone.0228141.ref009], [@pone.0228141.ref006], [@pone.0228141.ref010], [@pone.0228141.ref011]\]. The appetite for risk is also related to regulatory capital arbitrage. (\[[@pone.0228141.ref003]\]; p. 245) state that "banks became riskier and increased systemic risk as they took advantage of securitization in order to obtain capital relief" in the years preceding the 2007--2009 crisis. Banks have often used securitization to lower costly equity capital charges in complying with the terms of regulatory requirements. Securitization enables banks to improve their capital adequacy ratios without reducing the risk of their loan portfolios. In other words, banks can securitize less risky loans and maintain the riskiest \[[@pone.0228141.ref012]\]. While it would seem that banks do not select and securitize corporate loans of lower credit quality, in the end, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates by more than those in the control group \[[@pone.0228141.ref013]\]. It is certainly true that a securitization instrument that retains risk may induce more prudent risk behavior in banks when compared to an instrument that provides only risk transference \[[@pone.0228141.ref014], [@pone.0228141.ref012]\]. However, (\[[@pone.0228141.ref015]\], p. 47) affirm that "a profit maximizing bank will choose to retain the mezzanine tranche and therefore exert less screening effort. This is because due to tax incentives and mispriced government subsidies, debt is the cheaper source of capital which in turn increases the cost of equity tranche retention".

The complexity of all these factors taken together means that there is little or no agreement as to the impact of securitization and how it affects the originators and the market as a whole, and this in spite of the vast swathe of literature that attempts to unravel the complex underlying relationships and mechanisms of the entities and mechanisms involved. The first authors to look at securitization, particularly those authors carrying out theoretical studies, (\[[@pone.0228141.ref008]\], \[[@pone.0228141.ref016]\] and \[[@pone.0228141.ref017]\], among others), underline a negative impact on bank lending standards and the stability of the financial system. However, prior to the crisis there was a pervasive argument for the idea that securitization stabilized the financial system since it was easier for entities to diversify, manage and allocate risk right across the economy \[[@pone.0228141.ref018], [@pone.0228141.ref019]\]. Empirical studies are also contradictory. Some indicate that the entities that carry out most securitization are also those that lend to the highest risk agents, maintain the riskiest portfolios and retain the riskiest tranches \[[@pone.0228141.ref020], [@pone.0228141.ref021], [@pone.0228141.ref022], [@pone.0228141.ref023]\]. In contrast, there are empirical studies that seem to show that securitization reduces the risk of insolvency, increases both profit and liquidity and stimulates the supply for loans (\[[@pone.0228141.ref024], [@pone.0228141.ref025]\]; among others). \[[@pone.0228141.ref018]\] show that these differences are in part, sometimes due to the fact that they analyze different segments of the securitization market or that they sometimes focus specifically on the USA or on European markets, with highly dissimilar structures, entities and legislation. \[[@pone.0228141.ref003]\] carry out a systematic, comprehensive review of the recent empirical literature on securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability and highlight that there are serious gaps in the research. Specifically, they point to the literature that looks at the effects of the post 2007--2009 crisis on the banks' securitization behaviour, and whether and how securitization structures and pricing have changed that crisis. They state that; "it is imperative to investigate the extent to which securitization results in risk transfer during this period" (p. 251).

As mentioned above, the objective of this paper is to analyze the systematic risk of originating entities in Europe as a whole, on the periphery, within core countries, and within individual countries. The analysis aims to discover how this systematic risk might become systemic risk and undermine financial stability. There is significant cross-country variation in the European securitization markets, which stems from legal and regulatory differences. Empirical studies have thus far analyzed all countries taken together or individually, but there have not been enough observations to be able to analyze several countries individually in the same paper. We also study two groups of countries, which are differentiated according to the magnitude of the crisis they experienced, i.e. countries at core of Europe and those on the periphery. The aim of this differentiation was to discover whether the impact of securitization was different within these two groups. This is the only way to identify the differences that exist among them and to carry out an accurate assessment of the current status of the European securitization market. There are empirical studies that reference European markets which provide evidence that shows that securitization affects the risk profile of issuing entities in the pre-crisis period by increasing their systematic risk \[[@pone.0228141.ref026], [@pone.0228141.ref010], [@pone.0228141.ref009], [@pone.0228141.ref027], [@pone.0228141.ref028], [@pone.0228141.ref029], [@pone.0228141.ref030]\]. These studies indicate that the decrease in risk derived from securitization is counterbalanced by investments in new riskier assets. Moreover, they hypothesize that risk reduction by means of securitization is essentially determined by separating the issue into tranches. Another empirical studies, between others \[[@pone.0228141.ref031]\] and \[[@pone.0228141.ref032]\], show that credit risk securitization also has a negative impact on the issuing banks' financial soundness.

Finally, a larger post-event beta might simply be due to the direct effect as a consequence of the fact that the first loss tranches are more likely to fail than the senior tranches. In addition, \[[@pone.0228141.ref027]\] study whether the increase in bank risk is due to higher individual bank risk or higher systemic risk. They find that the increase in beta is due purely to an increase in the correlation with the market (systemic risk). There may even be a decrease in the individual risk.

3. Data and sources {#sec003}
===================

Our database is made up of 535 issues of securitization carried out in Spain, the UK, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Austria and France between 2000 and 2017. The data was obtained from the Datastream database (Thomson Financial Services). It was supplemented with information from existing asset securitization management companies' web pages and from the supervisory authority of the financial markets of the countries analyzed.

We utilize event study methodology, commonly used in similar types of analysis, to look at the information content of corporate events. The goal is to test for the existence of a securitization effect and to estimate its magnitude. The event study methodology employed in this paper is based on share price information and our database contains European issues carried out by listed banks. There are 63 originators who generate 535 securitization issues. We use daily closing share prices obtained from the Datastream database. Tables [1](#pone.0228141.t001){ref-type="table"} and [2](#pone.0228141.t002){ref-type="table"} show the volume and number of issues per year and country. As one can see, 60% of issues were carried out between 2006 and 2009, the majority of these being carried out in the UK, Spain and Italy. We highlight the UK's higher average volume per issue.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t001

###### Volume and number of issues by country; Pre-crisis and during the crisis.

![](pone.0228141.t001){#pone.0228141.t001g}

                Pre-crisis: 2000--2007.06   Crisis and post-crisis: 2007.07--2017                
  ------------- --------------------------- --------------------------------------- ------------ -----
  Germany       9 589.70                    12                                      7 192.40     6
  Austria       480.60                      2                                       275.60       1
  Denmark       10 513.80                   4                                       1 088.70     2
  Spain         88 029.20                   89                                      251 975.60   126
  France        2 668.10                    3                                       6 714.90     6
  Netherlands   810.10                      2                                       18 517.86    9
  Ireland                                                                           16 148.83    8
  Italy         41 277.70                   47                                      84 423.20    32
  Portugal      19 278.40                   16                                      33 234.90    25
  UK            139 001.90                  79                                      196 865.00   66
  *Total*       311 649.50                  254                                     616 437.00   281

Source: Datastream database

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t002

###### Volume and number of issues for the whole sample for each year.
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            Volume (million €)   Number
  --------- -------------------- --------
  2000      2 295.90             7
  2001      12 250.20            22
  2002      10 327.90            18
  2003      20 527.20            26
  2004      29 726.70            33
  2005      63 438.30            46
  2006      93 278.90            67
  2007      128 102.20           67
  2008      163 067.90           69
  2009      134 477.20           39
  2010      44 270.30            21
  2011      91 872.80            46
  2012      36 230.80            26
  2013      22 609.30            22
  2014      12 545.74            8
  2015      7 114.10             7
  2016      55 362.30            9
  2017      588.69               2
  *Total*   928 086.50           535

Source: Datastream database

The study uses daily closing prices for the Eurostoxx50 Index as indicators of the market portfolio.

4. Empirical methodology {#sec004}
========================

In this section, we describe the empirical methodology used in this study. A detailed analysis of said methodology may be found in the methodological appendix.

The first step in examining the impact of securitization on financial stability is to analyze the effect of securitization on the systematic risk of the issuing banks, an effect which we measure by using the beta coefficient. In the classic capital asset pricing model (CAPM), beta is given by the following expression: $$\beta_{i} = \frac{Cov\left( {R_{i},R_{m}} \right)}{\sigma_{m}^{2}} = \rho_{i,m}\frac{\sigma_{i}}{\sigma_{m}}$$ where R~i~ and R~m~ represent the returns of the banks' assets and the market respectively; ρ~i,\ m~ is the Pearson correlation coefficient between the return of the stock and that of the market; σ~i~ and σ~m~ are the standard deviations of the stock's return and that of the market respectively. Changes in beta therefore, depend on changes in the $\frac{\sigma_{i}}{\sigma_{m}}$ ratio and the correlation between the stock and market return.

In order to analyze the change in the systematic risk we adhere to the methodology set out \[[@pone.0228141.ref009]\] and \[[@pone.0228141.ref033]\]. This procedure allows the systematic risk to change while the event window is open and afterwards (in our case, the event itself corresponds to the securitization). It also makes it possible for the window to be asymmetrical around the day of the event itself, t~0~.

The resultant model that considers \[T~1B~, T~2S~\] asymmetric windows for which \|T~1B~\|\>T~2S~ is as follows: $$\begin{matrix}
{R_{i,t} = \beta_{i,0} + \beta_{i,1}R_{m,t} +} \\
{+ \beta_{i,2}\left\lbrack {({T_{1B} - t})({t - T_{2B}})D_{11,t} + ({T_{1S} - t})({t - T_{2S}}){C_{i}D}_{12,t}} \right\rbrack R_{m,t} + \beta_{i,3}\left\lbrack {({t - T_{1B}})(D_{11,t} + D_{12,t}) + ({T_{2S} - T_{1B}})D_{2,t}} \right\rbrack R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}} \\
\end{matrix}$$ where T~1B~ and T~2S~ represent the start and end of the event window; D~11,t~, D~12,t~ and D~2,t~ are the dummy variables. D~11,t~ is equal to 1 if T~1B~ ≤ t ≤ t~0~ and 0 otherwise. D~12,t~ is equal to 1 if t~0~ \< t ≤ T~2S~ and 0 otherwise. D~2,t~ is equal to 1 if t \> T~2S~ and 0 otherwise. *T*~2*B*~ = −*T*~1*B*~ and *T*~1*S*~ = −*T*~2*S*~ and C~i~ is a constant defined in the methodological appendix. *ε*~*i*,*t*~ is the error term and β~i~ are the coefficients that measure the systematic risk and possible changes in that risk.

In the second part, we analyze which parts of the banks' beta correspond to their correlation with the market and which to the ratio of deviations. Subsequently, we analyze whether the possible change in systematic risk has led to a change in bank correlations. To that end, following \[[@pone.0228141.ref027]\], we normalize the stock and market returns using their respective standard deviations and get a series with a standard deviation of one. We implement this transformation in the following regression model, where \~ represents the transformed series: $${\widetilde{R}}_{i,t} = \rho_{i,0} + \rho_{i,1}{\widetilde{R}}_{m,i,t} + \rho_{i,2}\left\lbrack {({T_{1B} - t})({t - T_{2B}})D_{11,t} + ({T_{1S} - t})({t - T_{2S}}){F_{i}D}_{12,t}} \right\rbrack{\widetilde{R}}_{m,i,t} + \rho_{i,3}\left\lbrack {({t - T_{1B}})(D_{11,t} + D_{12,t}) + ({T_{2S} - T_{1B}})D_{2,t}} \right\rbrack{\widetilde{R}}_{m,i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Where F~i~ is a constant defined in the methodological appendix and ρ~i~ are the parameters that measure the correlation between return of the stock and that of the market and possible changes or variations that may have come about because of the securitization.

Finally, the change in the ratio of standard deviations, $\frac{\sigma_{i}}{\sigma_{m}}$, is obtained as follows: $$\Delta\frac{\sigma_{i}}{\sigma_{m}} = \frac{\sigma_{i}^{1}}{\sigma_{m}^{1}} - \frac{\sigma_{i}^{0}}{\sigma_{m}^{0}} = \frac{\beta_{i}^{0} + \Delta\beta_{i}}{\rho_{i,m}^{0} + \Delta\rho_{i,m}} - \frac{\beta_{i}^{0}}{\rho_{i,m}^{0}}$$

Where 0 indicates the period immediately prior to the event window and 1, the period immediately after.

5. Results {#sec005}
==========

We carry out our estimations using a sample of 241 trading days symmetrically set around date of registration for the securitization with the supervisory authority of each financial market. Eq ([2](#pone.0228141.e003){ref-type="disp-formula"}) is estimated by maximum likelihood while assuming that the conditional variance of error term follows a GARCH(1,1) process. I.e., equations (A6) and (A7) in the methodological appendix are jointly estimated for maximum likelihood. The returns are obtained as the logarithm of the P~t~/P~t-1~ ratio, P~t~ being the stock price. Eurostoxx50 is taken as the market portfolio index. We obtain different estimations for each securitization.

Table A1 in the [S1 Appendix](#pone.0228141.s001){ref-type="supplementary-material"} shows that the series of returns are stationary (augmented Dickey--Fuller \[ADF\] test) and follow a non-normal distribution (Jarque--Bera \[JB\] test). In addition, the application of the Ljung--Box test shows that the first order autocorrelation coefficients of the squared and absolute values of bank returns are significantly different from zero. This indicates the existence of volatility clustering and the expediency of jointly modeling the conditional mean and variance in order to obtain more efficient estimators.

Using event study methodology, we calculated the mean for each of the estimated coefficients in Eq ([2](#pone.0228141.e003){ref-type="disp-formula"}). In order to test the significance of this measure we use both a parametric and a non-parametric test. The former is the t-test which is valid when there is normality. The latter is the Wilcoxon signed rank \[Wilcoxon SR\] test, which is applied to the median and is more suitable in the absence of normality which is the case here. The results are completed with the number and percentage of the coefficients, which are significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.

5.1. Results for the entire sample {#sec006}
----------------------------------

We used different lengths of both symmetrical and asymmetrical windows to carry out the analysis. \[[@pone.0228141.ref033]\] state that the most important feature of the estimated event window is its temporal location since small windows tend to miss important economic effects, while larger windows can bias results by combining abnormal returns from the event period with those that are external to it. \[[@pone.0228141.ref009]\] use symmetrical 21-day windows and, in order to control for robustness 11 and 41 day event periods. We use both symmetrical and asymmetrical windows. The former have durations of 31, 21 and 11 days. The asymmetrical windows use different combinations that begin at 15 or 10 days prior to the event. These windows always had longer periods of time prior to the event than after it. The number of days that the windows include after the date of the event varies between 14 and 5. It is therefore logical that, prior to the date we consider---the date of the event, i.e. the official registration of the issue, the market had heard about the securitization issuance. This would have occurred through the constitution of a special purpose vehicle or announcement for the issue for example. This would have affected the risk of the originating entity for longer than the post-registration period.We also used 3 different time periods, 2000 to 2017, 2000 to June 2007 and July 2007 to 2017. A summary of the most relevant results is given in [Table 3](#pone.0228141.t003){ref-type="table"}. To control for the robustness of our baseline regression we also carried out the analysis for other windows of different length -the results are available to those interested on request-. The first part of these findings shows the results for all the European securitizations which correspond to the symmetrical window \[-15,+15\] and the whole period. The results for the analyzed windows are similar and thus we only comment the results for the \[-15,+15\] and \[-15, +5\] windows as these are fairly representative.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t003

###### Summary results: Europe.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 535                                                                   
  **window -+15**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.01399   -2.473   0.014     2.567              0.010    99              18.5
  β~1~                    0.80509    36.883   0.000     19.765             0.000    466             87.1
  β~2~                    0.00008    0.770    0.441     0.122              0.903    125             23.4
  β~3~                    0.00150    3.527    0.001     4.167              0.000    201             37.6
  α~0~                    0.70727    9.981    0.000     19.941             0.000    357             66.7
  α~1~                    0.19935    14.893   0.000     18.216             0.000    429             80.2
  α~2~                    0.60332    40.138   0.000     19.245             0.000    426             79.6
  **β**                   0.80509                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.04512                                                                   
  **window -15+5**                                      Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.01361   -2.394   0.017     2.635              0.008    98              18.3
  β~1~                    0.80541    36.962   0.000     19.760             0.000    471             88.0
  β~2~                    0.00008    0.672    0.502     0.274              0.784    108             20.2
  β~3~                    0.00187    3.092    0.002     3.525              0.000    211             39.4
  α~0~                    0.70643    10.868   0.000     19.931             0.000    358             66.9
  α~1~                    0.19635    15.480   0.000     18.179             0.000    435             81.3
  α~2~                    0.59864    39.257   0.000     19.242             0.000    419             78.3
  **β**                   0.80541                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.03736                                                                   
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 254                                                                   
  **window -+15**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.01065    1.716    0.087     1.640              0.101    47              18.5
  β~1~                    0.55969    22.646   0.000     13.401             0.000    202             79.5
  β~2~                    -0.00018   -1.373   0.171     1.933              0.053    48              18.9
  β~3~                    0.00235    4.320    0.000     4.437              0.000    86              33.9
  α~0~                    0.56413    4.391    0.000     13.742             0.000    179             70.5
  α~1~                    0.22215    10.104   0.000     12.303             0.000    202             79.5
  α~2~                    0.55268    23.576   0.000     12.826             0.000    194             76.4
  **β**                   0.55969                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.07062                                                                   
  **window -15+5**                                      Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.01160    1.902    0.058     1.813              0.070    39              15.4
  β~1~                    0.56231    22.953   0.000     13.465             0.000    203             79.9
  β~2~                    0.00004    0.276    0.783     0.412              0.680    46              18.1
  β~3~                    0.00313    3.978    0.000     4.191              0.000    87              34.3
  α~0~                    0.57412    4.517    0.000     13.746             0.000    176             69.3
  α~1~                    0.21527    10.926   0.000     12.653             0.000    195             76.8
  α~2~                    0.55385    24.930   0.000     12.999             0.000    189             74.4
  **β**                   0.56231                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.06258                                                                   
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------

For the -/+15 window, all European securitizations and the period 2000 to 2017, the coefficients that measure the change in systematic risk are significantly different from zero in 125 cases for β~2~ and in 201 cases for β~3~, representing 23.4% and 37.6% of all the estimated coefficients respectively. However, the average for the β~2~ is not significantly different from zero, in contrast to the average for β~3~ which is.

In the conditional variance equation, 80% of α~1~ values and 79.6% of α~2~ are significant, which confirms the use of a GARCH(1,1). A similar situation is obtained in all of the estimations carried out as is shown in Tables from 3 to 10 of the results.

The mean of the estimated β~1~ coefficients before the event window is 0.8051. The mean of the β~2~ parameters is not significant but the β~3~ (0.0015) is. The β~3~ value means that the systematic risk grows during the event window while the value for β~2~ indicates linear growth. At the end of the window, systematic risk is equal to 0.8502 ([Fig 1](#pone.0228141.g001){ref-type="fig"}). This implies that the average increase in systematic risk is 0.0451 during the event window.

![Systematic risk (\[-15,+15\] window).\
Fig 1 Displays the evolution of the systematic risk within the window \[-15, +15\] centered on the registry date. This information is based on the results of [Table 3](#pone.0228141.t003){ref-type="table"}, obtained using 535 securitizations.](pone.0228141.g001){#pone.0228141.g001}

We assume that the response of returns to securitization issues, during and after the event period, completely reflects the economic effect of securitizations on the originating bank's systematic risk. The results do not differ substantially among the different windows. Therefore, even if the daily change in systematic risk during the window varies as a function of its size, the post-event beta resulting from the accumulated change is highly similar in all cases: 0.8428 and 0.8502 for the\[-15,+5\] and \[-15,+15\] windows respectively.

We then repeat the analysis by dividing the sample into two periods, from 2000 to June 2007 and from July 2007 to 2017. A summary of the results is given in [Table 3](#pone.0228141.t003){ref-type="table"} (above) for the \[-15,+15\] window and the pre-crisis period. As one can see, until June 2007, the parameters β~2~ and β~3~ are significantly different from zero by 18.9% and 33.9% respectively, for all of the coefficients estimated. The changes in systematic risk were sufficiently great to produce a significant mean in the case of β~2~ and β~3~. The mean of the estimated β~1~ coefficients before the event window is 0.5597. The mean of β~2~ is negative (-0.00018) and significant, which means that the evolution of systematic risk during the event window follows a quadratic function, a convex run of systematic risk, and reaches its minimum six days prior to the registration date ([Fig 2](#pone.0228141.g002){ref-type="fig"}); from that moment on its value increases. The systematic risk is 0,6303 at the end of the event window given that there is a significant value of 0.0024 for β~3~. Therefore, the main change in systematic risk within the window is 0.0706.

![Systematic risk pre-crisis (\[-15,+15\] window).\
Fig 2 Displays the evolution of the systematic risk within the window \[-15, +15\] centered on the pre-crisis registry date. This information is based on the results of [Table 3](#pone.0228141.t003){ref-type="table"}, obtained using 254 securitizations.](pone.0228141.g002){#pone.0228141.g002}

For the crisis and post crisis periods, changes in systematic risk measured within β~2~ and β~3~ are insufficient to produce a mean that differs significantly from zero. Therefore, the change in systematic risk is not significant. The definitive implementation of Basel II from 2007 implies that the volume of all the retained tranches would determine the regulatory minimum capital requirement. This dynamic is in line with our results, as we do not register a significant change in the systematic risk from 2007.

The average of the β~1~ coefficients for the whole period, i.e. the average beta pre-event for the entire period, is 0.8051, for the pre-crisis period 0.5597 and for the crisis period 1.0424. This would clearly seem to indicate that the systematic risk of entities is higher during the crisis than prior to it. It may also be true that securitization contributed to this increase in systematic risk during the pre-crisis period. The results for the crisis period are not included in the paper because the change in systematic risk is not significant. However, they are available on request.

As discussed in section 4, we also performed the analysis for asymmetrical windows and results do not differ substantially from those obtained for symmetrical windows. Only in the period 2000 to June 2007 with asymmetrical windows is the β~2~ coefficient non-significant, implying a linear trend in the rise in the value of beta. The linear trend in the increase in beta is also the behaviour observed in the analyses by groups and by single countries when the increase in systematic risk is significant. The results for other windows and periods are similar. [Table 3](#pone.0228141.t003){ref-type="table"} shows a summary of the results for the entire period and from 2000 to June 2007 and the \[-15,+5\] window.

The results of our estimations show an increase in the systematic risk of the European banks during the event window. Initially, given that securitization is a vehicle that enables risk transference, this might look unusual. Nevertheless, when the tail risk of the senior tranches (the least risky) is lower than the risk of default in the first losses tranches retained by the originator, there is little or zero probability of risk transmission. In addition, the post event systematic risk increases when the liquidity of the originator is reinvested in riskier assets (indirect effect). This scenario is perfectly possible in European markets since banks were permissive in providing credit and the requisites and regulations in place prior to the crisis were less demanding. Even the reinvestment of liquidity in a diversified portfolio might have led to an increase in beta when the pre-event value is lower than 1, as occurs in our analysis. If the diversification of the bank's portfolio increases, its performance becomes more closely allied to that of the market and, by extension, its beta will tend to 1. In addition, the systematic risk might increase if the liquidity is used to modify the structure of the capital. This could be in the form of paying higher dividends, or repurchasing their own stocks, which might lead to an increase in leverage and a consequent increase in risk.

Finally, Eqs ([3](#pone.0228141.e004){ref-type="disp-formula"}) and ([4](#pone.0228141.e006){ref-type="disp-formula"}) allow us to determine the part of the increase in beta that is due to the correlation effect and that which is due to the quotient for the standard deviations of the banks in relation to the market. For the pre-crisis period and the \[-15,+15\] window, [Table 4](#pone.0228141.t004){ref-type="table"} shows that the average increase in ρ is 0.022. In addition, the positive result obtained for Δ(σi/σm) equal to 0.0926 indicates that one part of the rise in beta is due to a convergence in the correlations between the originators and the market and the other is due to an increase in bank-specific risk. This means that the growth in beta that takes place as the outcome of securitization gives rise to an increase in bank correlations and specific risk for each entity. We find the same result for asymmetric windows. For the whole period, the increase in ρ is non-significant; therefore, we cannot conclude that risk was transferred to the market. Thus, the increase in beta is due only to an increase in bank-specific risk.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t004

###### Summary results--normalized: Europe.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ --------- --------------- ------------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 535                                                                    
  **window -+15**                                       Wilcoxon SR test             coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number    percentage      
  ρ~0~                    -0.00560   -2.112   0.035     2.073              0.038     88              16.5
  ρ~1~                    0.53513    44.682   0.000     19.843             0.000     465             86.9
  ρ~2~                    -0.00007   -1.420   0.156     0.898              0.369     83              15.5
  ρ~3~                    0.00006    0.263    0.792     0.723              0.470     158             29.5
  α~0~                    0.20808    21.830   0.000     20.036             0.000     331             61.9
  α~1~                    0.17114    14.495   0.000     17.342             0.000     389             72.7
  α~2~                    0.55084    34.131   0.000     18.623             0.000     383             71.6
  **ρ**                   0.53513                                                                    
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                          
  **window-15+5**                                                                    coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    -0.00687   -2.626   0.009     2.549              0.011     88              16.5
  ρ~1~                    0.53606    44.906   0.000     19.870             0.000     470             87.9
  ρ~2~                    0.00001    0.245    0.807     1.136              0.256     89              16.6
  ρ~3~                    0.00001    -0.030   0.976     0.075              0.940     156             29.2
  α~0~                    0.20246    21.513   0.000     20.038             0.000     333             62.2
  α~1~                    0.17268    15.315   0.000     17.613             0.000     389             72.7
  α~2~                    0.54984    34.092   0.000     18.674             0.000     388             72.5
  **ρ**                   0.53606                                                                    
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                          
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 254                                                                    
  **window+-15**                                                                     coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.0075     1.894    0.059     1.580              0.114     45              17.8
  ρ~1~                    0.4342     24.987   0.000     13.575             0.000     201             79.5
  ρ~2~                    -0.0002    -2.558   0.011     2.187              0.029     38              15.0
  ρ~3~                    0.0007     2.069    0.040     2.357              0.018     77              30.4
  α~0~                    0.2614     14.986   0.000     13.813             0.000     167             66.0
  α~1~                    0.1788     9.478    0.000     11.443             0.000     183             72.3
  α~2~                    0.5116     19.948   0.000     12.294             0.000     182             71.9
  **ρ**                   0.4342                                                                     
  **Δρ**                  0.0220                                                                     
  **window-15+5**                                                                    coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.00787    2.062    0.040     1.855              0.064     40              15.8
  ρ~1~                    0.43233    24.632   0.000     13.552             0.000     204             80.3
  ρ~2~                    -0.00002   -0.234   0.815     0.414              0.679     44              17.3
  ρ~3~                    0.00116    2.265    0.024     2.537              0.011     85              33.5
  α~0~                    0.25595    14.570   0.000     13.814             0.000     166             65.4
  α~1~                    0.17812    9.251    0.000     11.677             0.000     186             73.2
  α~2~                    0.51161    19.950   0.000     12.294             0.000     185             72.8
  **ρ**                   0.43233                                                                    
  **Δρ**                  0.02316                                                                    
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ --------- --------------- ------------

In light of the findings, we can affirm that securitization gave rise to a growth in global or systemic risk within the European financial system in the pre-crisis period but not during and after the crisis period.

We have included a control analysis of the type of underlying asset, which differentiates between mortgages, business loans and others. For the period prior to the crisis, in the issues that contain mortgage and business loan collateral, an increase in systematic risk is registered. This increase is not significant for securitizations with other types of collateral. On carrying out the decomposition, we find that, when the underlying collateral consists of business loans, the increase in ρ is not significant at the 5% level. This contrasts with mortgage securitization where the increase in ρ is significant, and ranges between 0.0293 and 0.0183 depending on the window. We can affirm that the increase in the pre-crisis systematic risk led to an increase in the correlation with the market and the specific risk of the originators in the case of mortgage securitizations. In the case of lending to companies however, this only resulted in an increase in the specific risk. The results are available upon request from the authors.

5.2. Results of core vs. periphery {#sec007}
----------------------------------

The following stage involves carrying out the analysis for two groups, which we labelled core and periphery. The former group contained Germany, Austria, Denmark, France, Netherlands and UK; and the latter, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. This second group is made up of countries for whom the effects of the crisis were deeper and lasted longer than the rest of Europe. These countries are located on the periphery and characterized by the fragility of their economies.

[Table 5](#pone.0228141.t005){ref-type="table"} provides an overview of the results for peripheral countries. Irrespective of the window used, on average, securitization during the period immediately prior to the crisis produces an increase in systematic risk. This behaviour is also observed when analysing the whole period, although the increase in risk is less pronounced. However, in the period prior to the crisis, this phenomenon is not present.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t005

###### Summary results: Periphery.
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  ------------------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------
  **Period 2000--2017** n = 343                                                                           
  **window -+15**                                             Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                                  mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  β~0~                            -0.03444   -4.692   0.000   4.764              0.000    72              21.0
  β~1~                            0.76068    28.175   0.000   15.675             0.000    291             84.8
  β~2~                            0.00011    0.925    0.356   0.115              0.908    84              24.5
  β~3~                            0.00120    2.289    0.023   2.608              0.009    131             38.2
  α~0~                            0.63194    7.561    0.000   15.990             0.000    225             65.6
  α~1~                            0.20571    11.877   0.000   15.093             0.000    282             82.2
  α~2~                            0.61399    34.859   0.000   15.635             0.000    272             79.3
  β                               0.76068                                                                  
  Δβ                              0.03606                                                                  
  **window -15+5**                                            Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                                  mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  β~0~                            -0.03467   -4.752   0.000   4.818              0.000    71              20.7
  β~1~                            0.76414    28.246   0.000   15.687             0.000    293             85.4
  β~2~                            0.00005    0.342    0.732   0.654              0.513    76              22.2
  β~3~                            0.00126    1.692    0.092   1.883              0.060    142             41.4
  α~0~                            0.68032    7.866    0.000   15.979             0.000    222             64.7
  α~1~                            0.20285    12.259   0.000   15.139             0.000    282             82.2
  α~2~                            0.60821    33.846   0.000   15.564             0.000    272             79.3
  **β**                           0.76414                                                                  
  **Δβ**                          0.02522                                                                  
  **Pre-crisis**                  n = 152                                                                  
  **window -+15**                                             Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                                  mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  β~0~                            -0.00295   -0.321   0.749   0.141              0.888    28              18.4
  β~1~                            0.50638    15.718   0.000   10.210             0.000    118             77.6
  β~2~                            -0.00016   -0.912   0.363   1.783              0.075    29              19.1
  β~3~                            0.00275    3.551    0.001   3.411              0.001    63              41.5
  α~0~                            0.42989    4.985    0.000   10.692             0.000    106             69.7
  α~1~                            0.25378    7.412    0.000   10.131             0.000    123             80.9
  α~2~                            0.55163    19.674   0.000   10.212             0.000    114             75.0
  **β**                           0.50638                                                                  
  **Δβ**                          0.08238                                                                  
  **window -15+5**                                            Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                                  mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              número   percentage      
  β~0~                            -0.00174   -0.194   0.846   0.128              0.898    27              17.8
  β~1~                            0.50781    15.899   0.000   10.258             0.000    121             79.6
  β~2~                            0.00001    -0.040   0.968   0.924              0.355    30              19.7
  β~3~                            0.00357    3.163    0.002   3.233              0.001    67              44.1
  α~0~                            0.45265    5.072    0.000   10.692             0.000    106             69.7
  α~1~                            0.25083    7.737    0.000   10.228             0.000    122             80.3
  α~2~                            0.54896    19.312   0.000   10.157             0.000    114             75.0
  **β**                           0.50781                                                                  
  **Δβ**                          0.07144                                                                  
  ------------------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------

On analysing whether or not the increase in systematic risk may result in an increase in the correlation with market behaviour ([Table 6](#pone.0228141.t006){ref-type="table"}), it may be observed that there is only a significant increase in ρ for the period prior to the crisis. The average increase for the +/- 15 window is equal to 0.0287. A Δ(*σ*~*i*~/*σ*~*m*~) score of 0.106 shows that one part of the increase goes towards an increase in bank correlations and the other to an increase in the specific risk for each entity. However, for the \[-15,+5\] window, there is only a Δρ which is significant at the 10% level.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t006

###### Summary results-normalized: Periphery.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------------
  **Period 2000--2017**    n = 343                                                                
  **window -+15**                                     Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  ρ~0~                    -0.01315   -3.807   0.000   3.646              0.000    64              18.7
  ρ~1~                    0.52572    33.466   0.000   15.811             0.000    292             85.1
  ρ~2~                    -0.00005   -0.869   0.385   0.723              0.469    57              16.6
  ρ~3~                    0.00016    0.558    0.577   0.698              0.485    96              28.0
  α~0~                    0.20053    17.072   0.000   16.045             0.000    210             61.2
  α~1~                    0.18222    12.166   0.000   14.710             0.000    256             74.6
  α~2~                    0.54701    28.291   0.000   15.064             0.000    242             70.6
  **ρ**                   0.52572                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                        
  **window-15+5**                                                                 coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   Wilcoxon SR test   p-val    number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    -0.01419   -4.133   0.000   3.976              0.000    67              19.5
  ρ~1~                    0.52810    33.555   0.000   15.851             0.000    297             86.6
  ρ~2~                    -0.00006   -0.831   0.407   0.070              0.944    64              18.7
  ρ~3~                    0.00007    0.184    0.854   0.019              0.985    95              27.7
  α~0~                    0.19460    16.838   0.000   16.048             0.000    219             63.85
  α~1~                    0.17983    12.694   0.000   14.797             0.000    261             76.09
  α~2~                    0.54928    28.161   0.000   15.067             0.000    249             72.6
  **ρ**                   0.52810                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                        
  **Pre-crisis**           n = 152                                                                 
  **window+-15**                                                                  coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   Wilcoxon SR test   p-val    number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.0042     0.775    0.439   0.630              0.529    27              17.8
  ρ~1~                    0.4094     18.119   0.000   10.434             0.000    118             77.6
  ρ~2~                    -0.0002    -2.069   0.040   2.004              0.045    22              14.5
  ρ~3~                    0.0010     2.093    0.038   2.319              0.020    42              27.6
  α~0~                    0.2282     13.287   0.000   10.694             0.000    93              61.2
  α~1~                    0.2100     7.274    0.000   9.844              0.000    112             73.7
  α~2~                    0.5415     19.384   0.000   10.169             0.000    112             73.7
  **ρ**                   0.40944                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0.0287                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                                                 coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   Wilcoxon SR test   p-val    number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.00358    0.660    0.510   0.591              0.554    26              17.1
  ρ~1~                    0.41434    18.205   0.000   10.477             0.000    124             81.6
  ρ~2~                    -0.00014   -1.231   0.220   1.294              0.196    22              14.5
  ρ~3~                    0.00085    1.345    0.181   1.658              0.097    37              24.3
  α~0~                    0.23082    12.870   0.000   10.694             0.000    94              61.8
  α~1~                    0.20998    7.357    0.000   9.842              0.000    111             73.0
  α~2~                    0.52487    17.562   0.000   9.939              0.000    111             73.0
  **ρ**                   0.41434                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0.01698                                                                  
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------------

Tables [7](#pone.0228141.t007){ref-type="table"} and [8](#pone.0228141.t008){ref-type="table"} provide an overview of the results for core countries. As with the peripheral countries, the core countries exhibit an increase in systematic risk for the period immediately prior to the crisis, but not during the subsequent period. The main difference resides in the fact that there is no transmission of risk to the market. This can be seen in [Table 8](#pone.0228141.t008){ref-type="table"}, in which the normalized results show that ρ~3~ is not significant. Therefore, it may only be asserted that the increase in systematic risk has led to an increase in idiosyncratic bank risk. There may be many reasons that explain this difference. The fact that their economies were stronger, the financial crisis less virulent in these countries, and the support received by financial institutions, are almost certainly three of the most important factors that prevented the transmission of increased risk to the market place.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t007

###### Summary results: Core.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 192                                                                 
  **window -+15**                                     Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.02255    2.777    0.006   2.385              0.017    27              14.1
  β~1~                    0.88443    24.260   0.000   11.995             0.000    175             91.2
  β~2~                    0.00002    0.132    0.895   0.268              0.789    41              21.4
  β~3~                    0.00204    2.801    0.006   3.465              0.001    70              36.5
  α~0~                    0.84185    6.528    0.000   11.941             0.000    132             68.8
  α~1~                    0.18798    9.012    0.000   9.990              0.000    147             76.6
  α~2~                    0.58426    21.127   0.000   11.237             0.000    154             80.2
  **β**                   0.88443                                                                  
  **Δβ**                  0.06132                                                                  
  **window -15+5**                                    Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.02401    2.870    0.005   2.294              0.022    27              14.1
  β~1~                    0.87914    24.257   0.000   11.979             0.000    178             92.7
  β~2~                    0.00012    0.711    0.478   0.396              0.692    32              16.7
  β~3~                    0.00295    2.872    0.005   3.347              0.001    69              35.9
  α~0~                    0.75308    7.953    0.000   11.931             0.000    136             70.8
  α~1~                    0.18475    9.523    0.000   9.805              0.000    153             79.7
  α~2~                    0.58155    20.873   0.000   11.295             0.000    147             76.6
  **β**                   0.87914                                                                  
  **Δβ**                  0.05904                                                                  
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 102                                                                  
  **window -+15**                                     Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.01596    1.998    0.048   1.566              0.117    14              13.7
  β~1~                    0.62782    17.080   0.000   8.733              0.000    86              84.3
  β~2~                    -0.00008   -0.420   0.675   0.023              0.981    22              21.6
  β~3~                    0.00214    2.981    0.004   3.251              0.001    26              25.5
  α~0~                    0.43471    8.175    0.000   8.676              0.000    73              71.6
  α~1~                    0.18776    8.167    0.000   7.267              0.000    80              78.4
  α~2~                    0.54504    15.017   0.000   8.159              0.000    72              70.6
  **β**                   0.62782                                                                  
  **Δβ**                  0.06429                                                                  
  **window -15+5**                                    Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              número   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.01723    2.127    0.036   1.819              0.069    16              15.7
  β~1~                    0.62359    16.706   0.000   8.696              0.000    89              87.3
  β~2~                    0.00016    0.811    0.419   0.461              0.645    11              10.8
  β~3~                    0.00346    3.568    0.001   3.552              0.000    23              22.6
  α~0~                    0.44865    8.192    0.000   8.676              0.000    73              71.6
  α~1~                    0.18859    8.123    0.000   7.144              0.000    80              78.4
  α~2~                    0.54934    16.177   0.000   8.426              0.000    72              70.6
  **β**                   0.62359                                                                  
  **Δβ**                  0.06916                                                                  
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t008

###### Summary results--normalized: Core.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 192                                                                 
  **window -+15**                                     Wilcoxon SR test            coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   p-val              number   percentage      
  ρ~0~                    0.00791    2.043    0.042   1.632              0.103    24              12.5
  ρ~1~                    0.55194    30.584   0.000   11.976             0.000    173             90.1
  ρ~2~                    -0.00005   -1.219   0.224   0.574              0.566    26              13.5
  ρ~3~                    -0.00011   -0.270   0.788   0.277              0.782    62              32.3
  α~0~                    0.22156    13.611   0.000   12.015             0.000    121             63.0
  α~1~                    0.15133    7.919    0.000   8.868              0.000    133             69.3
  α~2~                    0.55768    19.324   0.000   10.966             0.000    141             73.4
  **ρ**                   0.55194                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                        
  **window-15+5**                                                                 coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   Wilcoxon SR test   p-val    number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.00620    1.643    0.102   1.283              0.199    21              10.9
  ρ~1~                    0.55027    30.948   0.000   11.970             0.000    173             90.1
  ρ~2~                    0.00015    1.676    0.095   1.955              0.051    25              13.0
  ρ~3~                    -0.00016   -0.275   0.784   0.030              0.976    61              31.8
  α~0~                    0.21651    13.399   0.000   12.015             0.000    114             59.38
  α~1~                    0.15992    8.583    0.000   9.174              0.000    128             66.67
  α~2~                    0.55084    19.361   0.000   11.047             0.000    139             72.4
  **ρ**                   0.55027                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                        
  **Pre-crisis**           n = 102                                                                 
  **window+-15**                                                                  coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   Wilcoxon SR test   p-val    number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.0092     1.543    0.126   1.198              0.231    15              14.7
  ρ~1~                    0.4677     17.800   0.000   8.683              0.000    84              82.4
  ρ~2~                    -0.0001    -1.138   0.258   0.808              0.419    12              11.8
  ρ~3~                    0.0005     0.913    0.363   1.025              0.305    30              29.4
  α~0~                    0.2793     11.453   0.000   8.766              0.000    66              64.7
  α~1~                    0.1591     7.004    0.000   6.673              0.000    69              67.7
  α~2~                    0.4984     12.645   0.000   7.865              0.000    68              66.7
  **ρ**                   0.46766                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0.0000                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                                                 coefs sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-val   Wilcoxon SR test   p-val    number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.00826    1.428    0.156   1.108              0.268    13              12.8
  ρ~1~                    0.46278    17.788   0.000   8.663              0.000    84              82.4
  ρ~2~                    0.00015    1.238    0.219   0.951              0.341    12              11.8
  ρ~3~                    0.00074    1.034    0.304   1.165              0.244    29              28.4
  α~0~                    0.26414    10.918   0.000   8.766              0.000    63              61.8
  α~1~                    0.15606    6.973    0.000   6.803              0.000    67              65.7
  α~2~                    0.52250    13.254   0.000   7.965              0.000    70              68.6
  **ρ**                   0.46278                                                                  
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                        
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- ------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------------

5.3. Results by country {#sec008}
-----------------------

We now undertake an analysis of three individual countries; the UK, Spain and Italy. These are countries with large volumes of securitization, which means there is enough data to carry out a specific analysis. There are 145 securitizations for the UK, 215 for Spain and 79 for Italy, out of a total of 535. The remaining countries (France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Denmark, Germany and Ireland) are dealt with together because the number of existing securitizations for each would substantially weaken the results.

### 5.3.1. The United Kingdom {#sec009}

[Table 9](#pone.0228141.t009){ref-type="table"} provides an overview of the results for the UK. For the \[-15,+15\] window and for the whole period, the mean of the estimated β~1~ coefficients before the event window (systematic risk) is 0.822. The systematic risk is 0.8924 at the end of the event window because of a significant β~3~ value of 0,0021. The results for the \[-15,+5\] window are similar to those described above.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t009

###### Summary results: UK.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 145                                                                   
  **window+-15**                                        Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.02396    2.532    0.012     1.944              0.052    19              13.1
  β~1~                    0.82166    19.949   0.000     10.418             0.000    130             89.7
  β~2~                    0.00007    0.280    0.780     0.024              0.981    34              23.5
  β~3~                    0.00212    2.612    0.010     3.166              0.002    49              33.8
  α~0~                    0.94335    5.660    0.000     10.441             0.000    97              66.9
  α~1~                    0.19605    7.758    0.000     8.872              0.000    114             78.6
  α~2~                    0.56206    16.822   0.000     9.545              0.000    117             80.7
  **β**                   0.82894                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.06345                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.02580    2.611    0.010     1.786              0.074    19              13.1
  β~1~                    0.81386    20.004   0.000     10.400             0.000    132             91.0
  β~2~                    0.00022    1.042    0.299     0.823              0.411    24              16.6
  β~3~                    0.00301    2.691    0.008     3.146              0.002    44              30.3
  α~0~                    0.84185    6.980    0.000     10.445             0.000    101             69.7
  α~1~                    0.19465    8.380    0.000     8.736              0.000    117             80.7
  α~2~                    0.55455    16.719   0.000     9.620              0.000    109             75.2
  **β**                   0.83416                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.06012                                                                   
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 79                                                                    
  **window+-15**                                        Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.02353    2.683    0.009     2.167              0.030    13              16.5
  β~1~                    0.57261    14.346   0.000     7.548              0.000    63              79.8
  β~2~                    -0.00030   -1.258   0.212     0.755              0.450    17              21.5
  β~3~                    0.00239    3.919    0.000     3.365              0.001    16              20.3
  α~0~                    0.47401    6.425    0.000     7.709              0.000    56              70.9
  α~1~                    0.18554    8.543    0.000     6.517              0.000    64              81.0
  α~2~                    0.52856    12.374   0.000     7.128              0.000    59              74.7
  **β**                   0.57261                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.07158                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.02545    2.946    0.004     2.578              0.010    10              12.7
  β~1~                    0.57434    14.691   0.000     7.573              0.000    63              79.8
  β~2~                    0.00007    0.242    0.809     0.130              0.897    9               11.4
  β~3~                    0.00329    4.173    0.000     3.814              0.000    14              17.7
  α~0~                    0.51008    6.899    0.000     7.719              0.000    55              69.6
  α~1~                    0.18602    8.737    0.000     6.747              0.000    62              78.5
  α~2~                    0.48298    10.517   0.000     6.668              0.000    55              69.6
  **β**                   0.57434                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.06572                                                                   
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------

For the pre-crisis period and for both symmetrical and asymmetrical windows, the results again coincide with those mentioned above. However, β~1~ now has a lower value (0.57), which increases by approximately 0.07. The resultant score for the final systematic risk is 0.64, which is below the final figure reached for the entire period. During the crisis and afterwards the changes in systematic risk are non-significant for all of the windows analyzed.

Below, [Table 10](#pone.0228141.t010){ref-type="table"} shows a summary of the normalized results. The coefficient ρ~3~ is not significant for any of the periods analyzed and we cannot therefore draw any conclusions concerning the transfer of risk to the market, except that the increase in systematic risk is due to an increase in idiosyncratic bank risk.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t010

###### Summary of results--normalized: UK.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ --------- --------------- ------------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 145                                                                    
  **window -+15**                                       Wilcoxon SR test             coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number    percentage      
  ρ~0~                    0.00740    1.655    0.100     1.123              0.261     17              11.7
  ρ~1~                    0.51931    25.302   0.000     10.392             0.000     128             88.3
  ρ~2~                    -0.00015   -1.463   0.146     1.099              0.272     21              14.5
  ρ~3~                    -0.00013   -0.276   0.783     0.241              0.810     50              34.5
  α~0~                    0.23806    11.948   0.000     10.445             0.000     90              62.1
  α~1~                    0.15828    6.993    0.000     7.913              0.000     102             70.3
  α~2~                    0.53809    15.097   0.000     9.208              0.000     108             74.5
  **ρ**                   0.51931                                                                     
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                           
  **window-15+5**                                                                    coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.00690    1.559    0.121     1.113              0.266     15              10.3
  ρ~1~                    0.51864    25.695   0.000     10.394             0.000     128             88.3
  ρ~2~                    0.00012    1.162    0.247     1.289              0.197     14              9.7
  ρ~3~                    -0.00029   -0.431   0.667     0.140              0.889     50              34.5
  α~0~                    0.23323    11.897   0.000     10.445             0.000     81              55.9
  α~1~                    0.16400    7.550    0.000     8.181              0.000     96              66.2
  α~2~                    0.53666    15.592   0.000     9.385              0.000     106             73.1
  **ρ**                   0.51864                                                                    
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                          
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 79                                                                     
  **window+-15**                                                                     coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.01211    1.848    0.068     1.444              0.149     12              15.2
  ρ~1~                    0.43764    14.990   0.000     7.582              0.000     63              79.8
  ρ~2~                    -0.00023   -1.698   0.093     1.400              0.162     10              12.7
  ρ~3~                    0.00056    0.943    0.349     1.156              0.248     24              30.4
  α~0~                    0.28600    9.779    0.000     7.719              0.000     51              64.6
  α~1~                    0.14750    7.122    0.000     5.750              0.000     55              69.6
  α~2~                    0.49899    10.798   0.000     6.835              0.000     53              67.1
  **ρ**                   0.43764                                                                    
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                          
  **window-15+5**                                                                    coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.01152    1.838    0.070     1.576              0.115     11              8.9
  ρ~1~                    0.43529    14.568   0.000     7.558              0.000     62              78.5
  ρ~2~                    0.00003    0.212    0.833     0.100              0.920     8               10.1
  ρ~3~                    0.00085    0.983    0.329     1.205              0.228     26              32.9
  α~0~                    0.28242    9.812    0.000     7.714              0.000     51              64.6
  α~1~                    0.14819    7.107    0.000     5.896              0.000     57              72.2
  α~2~                    0.49519    10.458   0.000     6.805              0.000     54              68.4
  **ρ**                   0.43529                                                                    
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                          
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ --------- --------------- ------------

Besides not belonging to the Eurozone, the United Kingdom may be considered to be a special case, since its securitization market has been run by UK entities at the forefront of financial innovation and might therefore considered to be a world research centre for securitization. The close-knit relationship with another of the big global financial hubs (New York) gave rise to the immediate spread of the repercussions of the crisis already affecting the British originators. The interrelatedness of these two financial centers is what eventually gave rise to the UK's financial problems and not the low quality of the credit in the UK. It is curious that in our work, despite recording an increase in the systematic risk of the originating banks, there is no significant correlation with the market and therefore this increase only corresponds to an increase in the specific risk of the originator.

### 5.3.2. Spain {#sec010}

[Table 11](#pone.0228141.t011){ref-type="table"} shows the summarized results for Spain. For the entire period, both for the \[-15,+15\] and the \[-15,+ 5\] windows, there is an observable increase in systematic risk as a consequence of securitization, given that β~3~ is significant. The means of the estimated β~1~ coefficients before the event windows are 0.7928 and 0.7956 respectively. Immediately after the window, systematic risk has a value of 0.829 and 0.8214 for the \[-15,+15\] and \[-15,+ 5\] windows respectively.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t011

###### Summary results: Spain.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 215                                                                   
  **window+-15**                                        Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.03095   -4.204   0.000     3.693              0.000    48              22.3
  β~1~                    0.79281    23.234   0.000     12.337             0.000    181             84.2
  β~2~                    0.00008    0.632    0.528     0.026              0.980    52              24.2
  β~3~                    0.00121    2.310    0.022     2.492              0.013    82              38.1
  α~0~                    0.40622    8.194    0.000     12.644             0.000    140             65.1
  α~1~                    0.15821    13.709   0.000     11.808             0.000    175             81.4
  α~2~                    0.61976    26.607   0.000     12.305             0.000    167             77.7
  **β**                   0.79281                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.03615                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.03186   -4.324   0.000     3.753              0.000    45              20.9
  β~1~                    0.79559    23.364   0.000     12.351             0.000    180             83.7
  β~2~                    0.00004    0.230    0.818     0.358              0.721    45              20.9
  β~3~                    0.00129    1.674    0.096     1.928              0.054    92              42.8
  α~0~                    0.44400    8.152    0.000     12.628             0.000    138             64.2
  α~1~                    0.15790    13.560   0.000     11.879             0.000    177             82.3
  α~2~                    0.61614    26.258   0.000     12.260             0.000    169             78.6
  **β**                   0.79559                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.02576                                                                   
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 89                                                                    
  **window+-15**                                        Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.00968    1.161    0.249     1.137              0.255    16              18.0
  β~1~                    0.56369    12.344   0.000     7.720              0.000    69              77.5
  β~2~                    -0.00014   -0.845   0.401     1.231              0.218    15              16.9
  β~3~                    0.00258    3.204    0.002     2.778              0.006    36              40.5
  α~0~                    0.30100    6.835    0.000     8.191              0.000    67              75.3
  α~1~                    0.19367    8.776    0.000     7.593              0.000    76              85.4
  α~2~                    0.52460    12.162   0.000     7.238              0.000    66              74.2
  **β**                   0.56369                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.07740                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    0.01000    1.226    0.223     1.281              0.200    16              18.0
  β~1~                    0.56391    12.466   0.000     7.798              0.000    69              77.5
  β~2~                    0.00009    0.361    0.719     0.135              0.893    17              19.1
  β~3~                    0.00329    2.816    0.006     2.443              0.015    37              41.6
  α~0~                    0.25779    8.315    0.000     8.191              0.000    64              71.9
  α~1~                    0.18956    8.906    0.000     7.794              0.000    71              79.8
  α~2~                    0.58552    17.057   0.000     7.941              0.000    68              76.4
  **β**                   0.56391                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.06578                                                                   
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------

On dividing the sample into two periods, the pre-crisis period and the crisis and post-crisis period, the above results hold for the former, and there are no longer significant changes in systematic risk during the latter. One can also see that in the pre-crisis period, the mean of the β~1~ coefficients is lower than the mean for the whole period. Increases were recorded that reached 0.6411 and 0.6297 for the \[-15,+15\] and \[-15,+5\] windows, scores that were lower than those registered for the whole period.

The increase in systematic risk in Spain was probably due to the "originate to hold" type of securitization that was prevalent in the country. There is, therefore, no real risk transfer since the final loss for the portfolio is lower than that for the first-loss tranche. From the perspective of the indirect effect, the growth in systematic risk might have been produced by the reinvestment of the liquidity in assets of lower credit quality, exacerbated by an expansion in the amount of credit available. These results coincide with those obtained \[[@pone.0228141.ref030]\].

[Table 12](#pone.0228141.t012){ref-type="table"} provides the normalized results for the whole period with a symmetric window and the pre-crisis period with symmetric and asymmetric windows. In the three scenarios the ρ~3~ coefficient is significant and reflects increases in ρ of 0.02, 0.04 and 0.03 respectively. The results obtained for the Δ(σ~i~/σ~m~) are 0.011, 0.0556 and 0.0594 respectively, indicating that the increase in beta is due to an increase in the correlation between the originators and the market and an increase in the specific risk of banks, particularly in the pre-crisis period.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t012

###### Summary results--normalized: Spain.
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  ----------------------- ------------ -------- --------- ------------------ --------- --------------- ------------
  **Period 2000--2017**   n = 215                                                                      
  **window+-15**                                                                       coeff sig 10%   
                          mean         t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    -0.007969    -2.875   0.004     2.550              0.011     41              19.1
  ρ~1~                    0.564081     26.654   0.000     12.436             0.000     179             83.3
  ρ~2~                    -1.12E-05    -0.153   0.879     0.381              0.704     34              15.8
  ρ~3~                    0.000705     2.288    0.023     2.158              0.031     54              25.1
  α~0~                    0.192655     12.596   0.000     12.710             0.000     136             63.3
  α~1~                    0.139079     15.241   0.000     11.534             0.000     160             74.4
  α~2~                    0.543131     21.143   0.000     11.745             0.000     148             68.8
  **ρ**                   0.564081                                                                     
  **Δρ**                  0.021150                                                                     
  **window-15+5**                                                                      coeff sig 10%   
                          mean         t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    -0.014165    -3.306   0.001     2.989              0.003     42              19.5
  ρ~1~                    0.572265     27.444   0.000     12.516             0.000     184             85.6
  ρ~2~                    -0.0000545   -0.620   0.536     0.208              0.835     41              19.1
  ρ~3~                    0.000443     1.0398   0.299     0.433              0.665     52              24.2
  α~0~                    0.186840     12.627   0.000     12.708             0.000     138             64.2
  α~1~                    0.139839     15.102   0.000     11.636             0.000     162             75.4
  α~2~                    0.545163     20.878   0.000     11.736             0.000     154             71.6
  **ρ**                   0.572265                                                                     
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                            
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 89                                                                       
  **window+-15**                                                                       coeff sig 10%   
                          mean         t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.007743     1.099    0.275     1.313              0.189     16              18.2
  ρ~1~                    0.447051     13.620   0.000     7.954              0.000     66              75.0
  ρ~2~                    -1.38E-04    -1.164   0.248     0.888              0.375     14              15.9
  ρ~3~                    0.001332     2.522    0.014     2.516              0.012     24              27.3
  α~0~                    0.2456       9.208    0.000     8.191              0.000     64              72.73
  α~1~                    0.150322     9.364    0.000     7.332              0.000     69              78.41
  α~2~                    0.491998     10.970   0.000     7.013              0.000     66              75
  **ρ**                   0.447051                                                                     
  **Δρ**                  0.039900                                                                     
  **window-15+5**                                                                      coeff sig 10%   
                          mean         t-test   p-value   Wilcoxon SR test   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    0.00864      1.315    0.192     1.448              0.148     13              14.6
  ρ~1~                    0.45096      13.763   0.000     7.990              0.000     69              77.5
  ρ~2~                    -0.00008     -0.515   0.608     0.736              0.462     19              21.4
  ρ~3~                    0.00149      1.960    0.053     2.070              0.038     27              30.3
  α~0~                    0.23177      8.892    0.000     8.191              0.000     60              67.4
  α~1~                    0.14263      10.084   0.000     7.487              0.000     69              77.5
  α~2~                    0.53514      12.827   0.000     7.434              0.000     69              77.5
  **ρ**                   0.45096                                                                      
  **Δρ**                  0.02978                                                                      
  ----------------------- ------------ -------- --------- ------------------ --------- --------------- ------------

The decomposition of the beta coefficient shows that there has been an increase in the idiosyncratic risk, but that risk has also been transmitted to the market, increasing systemic risk (ρ).

### 5.3.3. Italy {#sec011}

The results summarized for Italy are shown in [Table 13](#pone.0228141.t013){ref-type="table"}. As we can see, in contrast to the UK and Spain there is no increase in systematic risk at the 5% significance level. For symmetrical windows, the systematic risk increases over the period of the event window only at a 10% significance level, and this follows a linear function. In this case, the pre- and post-event betas in the pre-crisis period show levels of 0.4859 and 0.5864, which are lower than the betas for the total period (0.7157) and (0.7869).

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t013

###### Summary results: Italy.
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  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------
  **Period 2000--2014**   n = 79                                                                    
  **window+-15**                                        Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.04747   -2.540   0.013     2.739              0.006    16              20.3
  β~1~                    0.71567    13.490   0.000     7.636              0.000    67              84.8
  β~2~                    0.00020    0.613    0.542     0.560              0.576    15              19.0
  β~3~                    0.00238    1.578    0.119     1.723              0.085    31              39.2
  α~0~                    1.39103    3.262    0.002     7.690              0.000    50              63.3
  α~1~                    0.30147    4.921    0.000     7.157              0.000    60              76.0
  α~2~                    0.59895    16.121   0.000     7.475              0.000    62              78.5
  **β**                   0.71567                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.07125                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.04222   -2.341   0.022     2.739              0.006    14              17.7
  β~1~                    0.72949    13.707   0.000     7.651              0.000    68              86.1
  β~2~                    0.00039    0.985    0.328     0.736              0.462    22              27.9
  β~3~                    0.00248    1.108    0.272     1.307              0.191    39              49.4
  α~0~                    1.37915    3.263    0.002     7.690              0.000    49              62.0
  α~1~                    0.28543    5.353    0.000     7.411              0.000    60              76.0
  α~2~                    0.59847    16.551   0.000     7.499              0.000    62              78.5
  **β**                   0.72949                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0                                                                         
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 47                                                                    
  **window+-15**                                        Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.01076   -0.479   0.634     1.159              0.247    10              21.3
  β~1~                    0.48591    9.658    0.000     5.783              0.000    36              76.6
  β~2~                    0.00001    0.026    0.980     0.143              0.886    7               14.9
  β~3~                    0.00335    1.734    0.090     1.847              0.065    19              40.4
  α~0~                    1.40942    2.119    0.040     5.952              0.000    27              57.5
  α~1~                    0.32678    3.502    0.001     5.635              0.000    34              72.3
  α~2~                    0.58557    11.669   0.000     5.730              0.000    35              74.5
  **β**                   0.48591                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0.10053                                                                   
  **window-15+5**                                       Wilcoxon SR test            coeff sig 10%   
                          mean       t-test   p-value   p-value            number   percentage      
  β~0~                    -0.00735   -0.332   0.742     1.169              0.242    9               19.2
  β~1~                    0.49743    9.915    0.000     5.815              0.000    36              76.6
  β~2~                    0.00011    0.213    0.833     0.238              0.812    10              21.3
  β~3~                    0.00408    1.415    0.164     1.540              0.124    21              44.7
  α~0~                    1.43187    2.176    0.035     5.952              0.000    26              55.3
  α~1~                    0.29725    3.739    0.001     5.794              0.000    34              72.3
  α~2~                    0.57805    11.889   0.000     5.751              0.000    35              74.5
  **β**                   0.49743                                                                   
  **Δβ**                  0                                                                         
  ----------------------- ---------- -------- --------- ------------------ -------- --------------- ------

[Table 14](#pone.0228141.t014){ref-type="table"} shows normalized results only in those cases in which the increase in systematic risk is significant at the 10% level. The ρ~3~ coefficient is non-significant in both of the cases in which there was increased systematic risk, either for the whole period or for the pre-crisis period. Therefore, we cannot draw any conclusions as to the transfer risk to the market.

10.1371/journal.pone.0228141.t014

###### Summary results--normalized: Italy.
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  ----------------------- ----------- -------- --------- ------------- --------- --------------- ------------
  **Period 2000--2014**   n = 79                                                                 
  **window+-15**                                         Wilcoxon                coeff sig 10%   
                          mean        t-test   p-value   signed rank   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    -0.016435   -2.309   0.024     2.793         0.005     14              18.0
  ρ~1~                    0.468822    16.853   0.000     7.665         0.000     67              85.9
  ρ~2~                    1.89E-06    0.013    0.990     0.159         0.874     15              19.2
  ρ~3~                    -0.000227   -0.276   0.783     0.130         0.897     29              37.2
  α~0~                    0.218203    7.143    0.000     7.695         0.000     45              57.69
  α~1~                    0.250749    4.853    0.000     6.810         0.000     57              73.08
  α~2~                    0.568853    14.279   0.000     7.318         0.000     58              74.36
  **ρ**                   0.468822                                                               
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                      
  **Pre-crisis**          n = 47                                                                 
  **window+-15**                                         Wilcoxon                coeff sig 10%   
                          mean        t-test   p-value   signed rank   p-value   number          percentage
  ρ~0~                    -0.007064   -0.701   0.487     1.296         0.195     10              21.3
  ρ~1~                    0.36943     10.478   0.000     5.847         0.000     36              76.6
  ρ~2~                    -4.67E-06   -0.022   0.983     -0.005        0.996     10              21.3
  ρ~3~                    0.001101    0.997    0.324     1.307         0.191     17              36.2
  α~0~                    0.277433    6.011    0.000     5.952         0.000     22              46.81
  α~1~                    0.277634    3.467    0.001     5.275         0.000     31              65.96
  α~2~                    0.517643    9.175    0.000     5.445         0.000     32              68.09
  **ρ**                   0.36943                                                                
  **Δρ**                  0                                                                      
  ----------------------- ----------- -------- --------- ------------- --------- --------------- ------------

Italian banks show a lower propensity for financial innovation. Securitization in Italy has never been a widespread financial operation as in other countries, such as the US, the UK and Spain \[[@pone.0228141.ref034]\]. Indeed, in the main, Italian banks have used customer deposits to finance their loan positions while the Italian securitization market itself has been concentrated in just a few Italian banks. The nature of Italian securitization has changed to a certain extent too. The amount of defaults as a proportion of total securitizations decreased over time after 2005. In Italy, the supervisory authority has taken a very cautious approach to securitization: banks may securitize primarily to facilitate turnover in the loan portfolio and to increase funding, and much less as a vehicle of risk transfer. As a consequence, the impact of the financial crisis on the Italian banking system was very limited. Finally, the fact that Italian banks were less active on international markets meant that they were less exposed to the worst hit financial markets. According to \[[@pone.0228141.ref035]\] the subprime mortgage market is only a small segment of the credit market (representing close to zero in the EU and less than 10% of all securitized mortgages in the US). In Italy, the subprime part of the market has remained relatively undeveloped because of an inherently cautious approach to securitization. In Italy, banks tend to securitize loans with specific characteristics, particularly those that are less opaque \[[@pone.0228141.ref023]\]. \[[@pone.0228141.ref035]\] reveal that during the 1995--2006 period, around two thirds of all equity tranches were directly retained by the originating banks (11% for the mezzanine and 4% for the senior tranches, respectively). Italian banks tend to securitize relatively good quality loans, choosing how much risk to keep depending on the characteristics of the transaction; they keep a higher proportion of the risk for themselves when the loans are of better quality. This is consistent with our results in which there is no increase in systematic risk and no risk transfer to the market.

### 5.3.4. Other countries {#sec012}

There are fewer available estimates for the remaining countries; France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Denmark, Germany and Ireland. Hence, we deal with these countries as a single group. There were 96 securitizations out of a total of 535 on the database for this group. The peculiarities of each country with regard to the securitization market means that treating them as a whole conceals the effects that securitization may have on each of these countries.

The results of the analysis for the different types and lengths of windows and for the different periods were not generally significant. Therefore, we found no significant increase in systematic risk in the event window, making an analysis of risk transfer to the market unnecessary.

6. Conclusions {#sec013}
==============

We analyzed a sample of 535 securitizations issued by 63 European financial entities from 2000 to 2017. The event analysis methodology allowed us to examine how systematic risk changed gradually within symmetrical and asymmetrical event windows. We find that securitization has caused an increase in the issuing entities' systematic risk within the 2000 to June 2007 period and that there is no significant change in systematic risk thereafter.

Similarly, the systematic risk of the originators before the event is greater during the crisis than in the pre-crisis or whole period. In the pre-crisis period, the initial systematic risk is at its lowest levels and gradually increases in a linear fashion.

The split between core and peripheral countries indicates that, in both groups, the systematic risk prior to the crisis increases because of securitizations, but no significant changes are observed from 2007 onwards. The above results are also recorded for securitizations issued in the UK and Spain, and for Italy too, but only for symmetrical windows.

The increase in systematic risk is concentrated in the pre-crisis period and arises through an increase in bank correlations (systemic risk) and in the specific risk for each entity. This effect, which was recorded for all of the European securitization issues and for the peripheral countries, was also present in the Spanish market but not in the core group and in the UK, where the increase in beta was due exclusively to an increase in the specific risk of the originating entity. On controlling for the type of collateral, we can affirm that the increase in systematic and systemic risk only takes place in the case of mortgage securitizations.

Undoubtedly, the cross-country, legal and regulatory differences in securitization markets, and even in the financial systems themselves, strongly influenced the economic behavior of individual countries and their banking entities in different ways prior to the financial crisis. The way Italian originators dealt with risk, limiting market securitization to high-quality loans and an "originate-to-hold" model, is perfectly captured by the methodology we use in this analysis. In contrast, the Spanish market was oriented towards retaining riskier tranches on the balance sheet together with a tendency to reinvest the cash flows from securitization in products that did not diversify the originator's portfolio. This explains the increase in systematic risk caused both by a closer correlation with the market and a greater exposure to risk for each individual entity. The UK market, which is similar to the US Anglo-Saxon model, clearly experienced an increase in systematic risk, but we cannot conclude that this risk was transferred to the market.

In general, until 2007, all primary issues were placed with final investors and other banks; post 2007, almost all deals were retained by the originating banks and many were used as collateral with central banks. As a result, and given that this procedure was common to all countries, the transmission of risk was no longer possible.

Our results are consistent with those obtained by other authors such as \[[@pone.0228141.ref026]\], \[[@pone.0228141.ref010]\], \[[@pone.0228141.ref009]\], \[[@pone.0228141.ref027]\] and \[[@pone.0228141.ref030]\], who show that the transfer of credit risk has important effects on bank risk. Our results add value in the sense that we not only analyze the period before the crisis, but the entire crisis period and the subsequent recovery. We find that there was no increase in systemic risk during the crisis periods and recovery, in contrast to the period directly preceding the crisis. The lengthy timeframe used in our study has allowed us to control for changes in the dynamic of securitization over time and to be able to state that the securitization structures have changed since the crisis. Further, and in contrast to other studies, we conclude that, in the pre-crisis period, a bank's increase in systematic risk is due to higher individual bank risk and higher systemic risk, and that these effects come about when the securitizations are based on mortgage collateral. Furthermore, we also conduct individual analyses for several countries, enabling us to carry out a comparison, hitherto impossible in similar studies. We have also developed a novel methodology that allows us to apply asymmetrical windows in order to detect relevant fluctuations financial stocks prior to registration. This methodology could be utilized to analyze a whole range of corporate events.

Our result is highly significant for all of those collectives that have links to securitization, i.e. the originators, investors, future shareholders, policy makers, rulers and pundits. Securitization has great potential for providing any market with liquidity and, as a consequence, improving the functioning of these markets. However, due to the very nature of these markets, the information that each of the participants has access to is different. This gives rise to conflicts and frictions, the consequences of which are sometimes grave. We consider that there are three aspects addressed in our work that represent an advance in the path towards greater transparency of the securitization market in Europe: the change in securitization structures after the financial crisis and the consequent change in the associated risk; the analysis of these changes according to geographic location; and the prevalence of risk transmission to the market in mortgage structures. It is hoped that this study will contribute to greater transparency in the European securitization market while mitigating the relative paucity of empirical literature on Europe after the crisis.
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